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Land formalisation 
Formalising landholding through the issue of legal land titles has proved to be a seductive 
proposition for a number of governments in the global south during the first decade of the 21st 
century.  Much of this thinking, and indeed policy development, has been based on Hernando 
De Soto’s conceptualisation of dead capital, perhaps most accessibly captured in The Mystery 
of Capital (De Soto, 2001).  The argument has been very persuasive in some influential 
quarters, and not least in the World Bank, where land titling is seen particularly as having the 
potential to promote increased private investment within the poor countries of the global 
south (Keivani, Mattingly and Majedi, 2008). 
 
In essence, De Soto’s argument is that most of the property in the global south is extralegal –
not illegal, but outside the legal sector in the sense that it is not formally registered and/or 
titled to identifiable owners with written documentary evidence as proof of ownership.  This 
does not necessarily mean that land is not ‘owned’, as ownership of plots of land by 
individuals may well be recognised by a range of local bodies such as village councils, chiefs 
or other locally-based authorities.  However, such types of ownership are rarely documented 
through formally written, or even electronically stored, documents that unequivocally 
attribute that land by law to a particular individual.  Even if written records exist, these are 
rarely seen to be valid in the legal sense of the word.  This is a challenging problem because, 
without such titles, De Soto argues, people cannot realise the full value of their land or 
property.  Land titles not only provide security for loans, but also a proof of existence of 
wealth which, along with a formal address, serves to strengthen business trust and social 
capital more generally.  Consequently, following De Soto’s argument, formal land titles 
provide the means of unlocking domestic capital for development.   
 
The problem with informal landholding systems is that although there may exist a thriving 
land market, the value of a piece of land can be realised only on the occasion when it is sold.  
At this point, the existing owner loses access to the value of the land, and therefore he or she 
can only receive a monetary reward for the land on that one solitary occasion.  However, a 
formal land title can be deployed as security against a loan, and hence the value of the 
property can be realised several times over the lifetime of the ownership, as long as, of 
course, each of the loans is repaid on time.  Extralegal property, therefore, is not fungible – it 
cannot be split up in various ways to generate funds for investment, as can be done with 
legally-recognised property.  In De Soto’s view, this is vital for economic development 
because, as he puts it: ‘Legal property thus gave the West the tools to produce surplus value 
over and above its physical assets’ (De Soto 2001, 49). Hence, property assets enable the 
generation of capital for investment through legally titled land being used as security or 
collateral. 
 
Land formalisation and titling in Tanzania 
It is this liberalisation of domestic assets that has proved to be attractive to many 
governments in the global south, anxious to delink themselves from aid dependency, but  at 
the same time rightly concerned that foreign direct investment, which might move into the 
space created by the reduction in development assistance flows, may pass them by.  The 
Government of Tanzania, in particular, has been especially keen to embrace De Soto’s ideas, 
although it has been by no means the only government to do so: see, for example, Peru 
(Calderon, 2004), and Botswana (Nkwae and Dumba, 2010).  The formalisation policy in 
Tanzania has been encapsulated within the Property and Business Formalisation Programme 
(going by the Kiswahili acronym of MKURABITA – Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na 
Biashara za Wanyonge) which started operation in 2005.  It is worth noting that, embedded in 
the programme’s title, there is a very clear and strong link between property and business, 
thus underlining the Government of Tanzania’s desire to liberate funds from legal property 
rights to finance business expansion.  Hence, MKURABITA was given the aim of 
transforming property and businesses held in the informal sector into legal entities, rooted 
firmly within the formal sector.   
 
There have, inevitably, been tensions in this process, not least because Tanzania’s constitution 
still recognises that all land title is invested in the state, which is at odds with the current 
government’s pursuance of a neoliberal, market-based approach to economic development.  
These tensions play out therefore between the desire for legal security of tenure for 
individuals and businesses, and the fact that all land is vested with the state.  Kulaba (2007) 
also notes that the proposed formalisation programme was essentially an imported foreign 
strategy which, in his view, failed to engage sufficiently well with the full range of actors and 
government departments in Tanzania.  Hence, a large amount of local material and 
understanding has not been gathered, much of which would have been of critical importance 
in shaping the subsequent programme itself. 
 
It was envisaged that MKURABITA would comprise four phases, these being: Diagnosis; 
Reform Design; Implementation; and Capital Formation (Kulaba, 2007).  The first phase has 
been relatively straightforward, and in the Diagnosis Report of the Property and Business 
Formalization Program, the total of what De Soto describes as dead capital in Tanzania was 
calculated to be in the order of $US29 billion.  To put this in perspective, this figure exceeds 
the total value of official development assistance, or aid, which Tanzania has received since 
independence in 1961.  There are serious methodological issues about how this figure was 
derived (as indeed there is around the figure of $US9.3 trillion which De Soto (2001) 
calculates as being the total value of extralegal land in the entire global south).  It was, 
however, estimated from land sales’ figures available from a vibrant land market in Tanzania, 
and especially Dar es Salaam.  The figure of $US29 billion is, of course, a seductive sum to 
be released by the legal formalisation of land and property, and, unsurprisingly, the 
Government of Tanzania has committed itself to a programme of formalisation.   
 
In Dar es Salaam alone, the value of extralegal property was put at $9.4 billion and 97% of 
businesses in the city were estimated to be extralegal with an additional value of $US2.2 
billion.  Hence, MKURABITA calculated that the value of dead capital in Dar es Salaam is 
$US11.6 billion, which is about 50 times the total foreign direct investment which has come 
into Tanzania since 2002.  Consequently, given that about 40% of Tanzania’s dead capital is 
seemingly located in Dar es Salaam, plus the fact that Dar es Salaam has the most vibrant 
land market in Tanzania, this has led to the city becoming the immediate focus of the 
formalisation programme. 
 
To encourage people to register their property, the Government of Tanzania launched the 
Residential Licence programme in May 2005 which was aimed at existing owners in areas 
that have not been formally surveyed by the Government of Tanzania, but on which people 
are living with secure tenancy/ownership rights.  A good number of people in these areas 
migrated to Dar es Salaam and settled as squatters, but as they have lived in these locations in 
excess of 10 years, and, in some cases, considerably longer, it is now accepted that they have 
residential rights.  For them, the Residential Licence programme is designed to shorten the 
length of the registration process, which, before MKURABITA, required a minimum of 68 
bureaucratic steps taking an average of 8 years at an average cost of $2250 to see through to 
finalisation (Property and Business Formalisation Program, no date).  It is hardly surprising 
that this process in itself was a major disincentive for anyone wishing to register their 
property formally and legally.  However, despite the truncated process introduced in 2005, 
uptake has been slow with only 52,000 applications made by November 2005, and, of these, 
only about 38,000 actually approved by 2008. 
 
The Government of Tanzania also launched the so-called 20,000 plots programme which had 
the ambitious aim of formally surveying that number of plots for future urban expansion.  By 
May 2006, the target had been exceeded with over 30,000 plots being formally surveyed and 
put up for sale.  These were located mainly in the peri-urban zones of the city, but they have 
often been controversial in that compensation levels paid to existing users of this land have 
been relatively low (sometimes as low as $US60), and the subsequent sale price of the 
surveyed land has been significantly higher, thus benefiting better-off households in the land 
market. 
 
 
The reality of land formalisation and titling 
The prospect of having a formal legal land title would seem to be a very attractive 
proposition, both providing security of tenure and collateral to release capital for investment 
along the lines envisaged by De Soto.  If people can demonstrate that they already ‘own’ a 
piece of land through usufructary land rights, or by having their land ‘purchase’ already 
recognised by the village or ward authority, then it is essentially a formality, although perhaps 
a time-consuming one, to have a formal land title issued.  To this extent, it would seem to be 
a rational decision to register the land formally.  However, preliminary research in the peri-
urban zone of Dar es Salaam suggests that the response by many people in this area has not 
been wholly favourable towards these new opportunities, and there exists an ambivalent 
attitude due to a range of clear and rational reasons for resisting formalisation. 
 
It became clear from interviews and focus group discussions that many people do not see the 
benefit  
of formalisation and land titling.  Not only is it seen to be a long and expensive process, many 
are unconvinced that they would gain any stronger security rights than they already enjoy.  If 
they have already registered their land purchase with the village or ward, they already have 
de facto security of tenure, something which is reinforced further once house construction is 
started on the plot.  There is little more to be gained by obtaining a legal land title.  
Significantly, it tended to be poorer landowners who expressed this view more strongly, as 
the expense of the formal registration process is a proportionately greater drain on their 
financial resources than for wealthier households.  There was also a concern that corrupt 
officials would have to be ‘looked after’, increasing the financial costs of registration.  
Similar observations have been made in Accra where views were expressed that the extra 
transaction costs of a more formal system were unattractive (Gough and Yankson, 2000; 
Antwi and Adams, 2003).  Nkurunziza (2008) draws similar conclusions in Kampala where 
the local context, separate from the state, remains strong and attractive to many. 
 
But it is more than just a financial constraint.  Many of the poorer landowners have little or 
no formal education and therefore the type of legal language used in formal land registration 
can be opaque and confusing.  There was a widespread fear expressed that they could be 
signing up for something that they do not fully understand and could end up being tricked 
into losing their land.  The process of formal land registration is seen to be complex, 
disembodied and abstract, unlike registration with the ward council, for example, which is 
seen to be real, grounded, experienced and relatively easily understood, with officials who are 
easily contactable on a daily basis. 
 
There is a further dimension to this resistance which is particular to Tanzania.  When 
Tanzania went through a strong socialist phase of its national development after the 1967 
Arusha Declaration, a key element of this programme was the creation of ujamaa villages 
throughout rural Tanzania (see, for example, Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1982).  This involved 
moving people from a largely dispersed rural population distribution pattern into about 8000 
nucleated villages spread across the geographic space of Tanzania, with each village engaging 
in communal production by pooling labour and capital resources.  In the event, very few of 
the 8000 villages ever became such fully-fledged ujamaa communities, but there was 
nonetheless a sense at that time that they had somehow ‘lost’ their land to the state, even 
though in practice this was rarely, if ever, the case.  Nonetheless, among those older people 
who experienced the ujamaa ‘operations’, the memory remains – the state had once before 
tried to take land, and, for them, land formalisation was yet another attempt to do so, albeit in 
a neoliberal rather than socialist framework.  Interviewees indicated this was a powerful 
negative narrative for those with long memories. 
 
Central to De Soto’s argument is the way in which having access to land title will apparently 
unlock capital for investment in business, whether it be in agriculture, industry, trading or 
petty business.  Indeed, this is a key driver for promoting formalisation and land titling.  
Whilst it is the case that a few landowners who had formal land titles had used them to secure 
loans, this was by no means a widespread practice.  As with the formal land registration 
process itself, it tended to be poorer landowners who were more suspicious and less likely to 
take up the opportunities.  A key reason was that they failed to see how, even with a formal 
land title, they could access credit anyway.  Because the Tanzanian banking and lending 
system is imbued with the values and practices of a globalised banking system, the 
application process for a loan can seem very daunting for poorer people with relatively little 
formal education.  Indeed, the very factors which militate against applying for a formal land 
title in the first place are repeated.  As one farmer in the peri-urban zone north of Dar es 
Salaam put it: “How can I prepare a business plan when I can’t read or write properly?”  But 
even for those lenders who are a little more accommodating, there are still problems 
associated with the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, as well as their likely ability to 
repay on a regular monthly basis.  For some banks, lending at this scale offers only a small 
profit margin, which may be outweighed by the risk they take in making the loan in the first 
place.  In the same way that the land titling process appears to favour the better-off, at the 
expense of the poorer groups, so does the opportunity to borrow money from banks, even if 
land is available to be put up as legal collateral.  The experience of some of our respondents 
suggests that being in possession of a formal land title is not necessarily enough in itself to 
unlock credit. 
 
In addition to this, a commonly expressed view was that many are reluctant to use their land 
as collateral anyway due to the risk that they could lose their land if they default on 
payments.  Especially for the poor, land represents their only security.  Land can fulfil the 
function of a social welfare or support system if all else fails – as a last resort, food can be 
grown on the land to survive.  Allied to this, there remains a strong cultural and economic 
affinity to land, reinforced by a strong element of risk aversive behaviour.  Research 
elsewhere indicates that risk aversion is even stronger for poorer than better-off groups 
(Home and Lin, 2004), and the findings in Dar es Salaam support this view.  As one 
respondent put it: “The risk of losing to the bank what little land I have is too much”.  
Although MKURABITA may recognise a strong entrepreneurial spirit among many in the 
urban and peri-urban areas of Dar es Salaam, this entrepreneurial spirit is firmly grounded in 
informal economic activities where cash transactions are the rule, and where credit, and loans 
are not generally part of daily practice.  The very different, even alien, ways of operating in 
the formal sector are not attractive.  Hence, if there exists a wariness, or downright 
unwillingness, to engage in the formal economic sector, where is the incentive to engage in 
the first place in the expensive process of formalising land title? 
 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the perceived opportunities which follow on from 
formal land titling, but there are also potential costs.  Significantly, the Property and Business 
Formalisation Program public information document sets out one of the key drivers of the 
formalisation programme as being to integrate extralegal property into the formal legal 
system “to boost economic growth, reduce poverty and eventually expand the tax base (my 
emphasis)” (Property and Business Formalisation Program, no date).  The existence of a 
database of formal ownership which accurately records exact location and size of holding 
means that people are easily traceable and hence accountable to the state.  This may have the 
benefit of generating a sense of business trust for formal economic activity, but it also has the 
cost of generating a geographically-specific tax framework.  If the MKURABITA report is 
even just reasonably accurate, then an informal business sector valued at $2.2 billion 
represents a very attractive taxable sum into which the state can tap.  For people balancing 
the advantages and disadvantages of applying for a formal land title, entering the tax system 
is an unattractive consequence. 
 
In some countries where land titling has been introduced, there has been an increase in rents 
subsequent to formalisation.  In parts of Cairo, for example, the land titling programme has 
resulted in the displacement of 21% of low-income tenants who could no longer afford the 
rents being levied (Payne, 2001).  Payne, Durand-Lesserve and Rakodi (2007) also point 
generally to the significant risks of rent rises taking place after formal titling, thus actually 
reducing security of tenure for some residents in these areas, most of whom are poor.  Until 
now, rent rises following titling in Dar es Salaam appear to be less of an issue, but there is 
still the need for much more careful and systematic research to confirm this.   
 
However, in Dar es Salaam, there has been a variation on this theme in that a land market for 
titled property has started to emerge, although this is seen less in the peri-urban areas of the 
city at the moment, and rather more in some of the more established urban areas.  In Manzese 
and Hannan Asif, for example, two former squatter areas, a land titling programme has led to 
an initial urban upgrading by the residents of these areas, similar to what was reported to 
have happened in Peru following formalisation (Canturias and Delgado 2004 cited in Payne, 
Durand-Lesserve and Rakodi, 2007,) and in Rio de Janeiro (Handzic, 2010), reflecting the 
residents’ greater confidence in having improved security of tenure.  However, both Manzese 
and Hannan Asif, because of their relatively close location to the city centre of Dar es Salaam 
along the transport artery of Morogoro Road, have started to become attractive locations for 
property speculators, safe in the knowledge that these properties now have formal, legal titles.  
The germ of a process of nascent gentrification of these former squatter areas has begun. 
 
 
As with the surveyed plots scheme in the peri-urban zone, it is wealthier groups who are able 
to take advantage and it is yet again poorer people who are being squeezed.  There is, though, 
an interesting twist to this.  Some have actively taken the opportunity to register their plots 
formally, but rather as a business opportunity, despite the expense and bureaucracy involved, 
and they have done so with the explicit intention of selling the land once formal titles have 
been gained.  There is evidence that the proceeds of these land sales are then invested in 
purchasing informal land located further out from the city centre in the peri-urban zone, often 
at distances of 40km or more, where land is cheaper.  This land is registered with the local 
village authority and the new owner waits for land values to rise.  This strategy is possible in 
Dar es Salaam, as there is still relative land abundance in the area surrounding the city, a state 
of affairs which does not exist around other cities in the region, such as Kampala and Nairobi. 
 
Final comments 
What is manifestly clear from Dar es Salaam is that despite what might seem to be the 
obvious attractions of possessing a legal land title, many people are still very wary of getting 
involved.  Land formalisation appears to be having different outcomes for different 
population groups - the opportunities afforded by formalisation appear to be of greater benefit 
to wealthier people.  Many of this latter group are already embedded within the tax system 
because of the jobs they hold in the government and public sectors, and increasingly the 
formal private sector: being identifiable to the state holds less fear than it does for those who 
are currently invisible to the state.  They also have access to greater amounts of capital, either 
through savings or access to credit, to allow them to participate as active buyers in the land 
market.  Mwamfupe (2007) has noted the tendency for poorer people to become increasingly 
marginalised as the land market develops and they choose to sell their land.  He has also 
noted that people tend to be forced to engage in economic activities such as charcoal making, 
sand mining and vegetable vending, more or less as a survival strategy, whilst those with land 
tend to engage in activities such as petty trading, tailoring, carpentry, metalworking and 
electronic repairs, all of which become possible with secure tenancy.  Ironically, therefore, it 
would appear that the land titling system, as it plays out in Dar es Salaam, tends to be of 
greater medium- and long-term benefit to the already wealthier urban residents, so 
reinforcing economic inequalities within the city. 
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